So the original argument does run:
1) humans exist entirely in space-time
2) if abstracta exist, they exist entirely outside of space-time
3) ((1)&(2))->(4)
4) it's likely that humans cannot have knowledge to abstracta
5) if platonism is true then ~(4)
6) platonism is not true
But for (1) and (2) you substitute 'space-time' for 'the present'. Thus:
1') humans exist entirely in the present
2') future events exist entirely outside the present
But it seems to be that (1') and (2') are counterparts not of (1) and (2) but:
A) humans exists entirely here
B) if abstracta exist, they exist entirely outside of here
Which seems to be a queer formulation. I think that being in the present 'time-wise' is the equivalent to being here 'space-wise'. If you are in the present, you are located in a segment of time. If you are here, you are located in a segment of space.
Is this ok? It seems that instead of (1') and (2') we should write (A') and (B'):
A') humans exist entirely in time
B') future events exist entirely outside time
where B') is false. I think that even if (1') is the correct rendering, it is false. Consider Wes qua spacetime worm. I exist in the present, where the present is Sept. 19, 2008 @ 11:10am. If we roll back the present to Sept. 19, 2007 @11:10am I exist there as well. Now, I don't exist if we roll back the present to Sept. 19, 1983 @11:10am, since I wasn't born yet. If we roll the present to Sept. 19, 2999 @11:10am I won't exist here either, But from the time I was born until I die, any segment of time we want to make the present, I exist.
Am I correct to see a disanalogy here? Or, if there is no disanalogy, that (1') is false?
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
2 comments:
You're correct in the dissanalogy, but it seems to be similar to an objection I address in the post.
My reponse was, consider the sept.19/2008 11AM wes. He exists only at one time. Anything in the future of 09/19/08 exists entirely outside that time. Therefore 09/19/08 wes can't know anything about any date past 09/19/08. This is just equivalent to saying that at 09/19/08, we san't know anything about the future. Proceed to generalize to all times.
I also thing that the formulation (A) and (B) only support the case. Formally they're no different from the original benaceraf formulation, but they clearly make a bad argument. Consider replacing (B) with (B')
(B') If France exists, it exists entirely outside of here.
The upshot is that knowledge of something, reference to something, bearing propositional attitudes to something, in general doesn't have to depend on spacial or temporal relations to that thing.
I guess I wonder:
1) If Wes is a thing, atemporally frozen, then he cannot know about the past or future. But Wes seems to be an event, a spacetime worm which is temporally located through past presents where he was present. I hope Wes makes it to future presents as well. Though the future is outside of this time, it is a potential present.
2) I would agree that knowledge of something, reference to something, bearing propositional attitudes to something, doesn't depend upon having spacial or temporal relations to that thing, but I still think that thing needs to have a spacial or temporal location.
If France exists outside of here, it just seems I could in principle go there. If Platonistic entities exist outside of spacetime, I'm not sure how I could go there.
The future exists outside of now, but it does seem that I could in principle go there.
Post a Comment