Stalnaker Comment Paper

1. It is an apparent fact that Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben.
2. If asked (even by himself) if Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben, Russell would assent.
3. If asked (even by himself) if he believed that Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben, Russell would assent.
4. If Russell was not asked (even by himself) if Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben, he could not assent.
5. If Russell was not asked (even by himself) if he believed that Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben, he could not assent.
6. If (2) and (4), then (7).
7. If Russell was not asked (even by himself) if Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben, he would not be able to believe it.
8. If (3) and (5), then (9).
9. If Russell was not asked (even by himself) if he believed that Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben, he would not be able to believe it.
10. If (1) and (7), (or if (1) and (9) ), then (11).
11. The belief that Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben is apparent, it is only a potential belief.
12. Russell's mind is just not big enough to store representations for all of the trivial and obvious facts that he takes for granted.
13. If (11) and (12), then (14).
14. For a potential belief to be actualized, potential believers must be asked (even by themselves) if they believe a potential belief.
15. Conclusion: Russell only has a potential belief that the apparent fact that Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben is true.

Stalnaker believes that someone who models beliefs on sentence-like representations of propositions must give this answer. But he points out that apparent beliefs cannot be merely potential beliefs, because they may still play an actual psychological role in the believer's actions and reasoning even if the believer never entertains the proposition.

To deny 15, Stalnaker suggests that we should adopt a pragmatic picture of belief. We should conclude that literally Russell does believe that Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben.

16. In some contexts, Russell's attitude towards a proposition may presuppose another proposition, or take it for granted.
17. If (16), then that presupposition was available to play the same role as his belief in the explanation of his behavior.
18. If (12), we should deny that a state of knowledge or belief as something with propositions as components at all.
19. Rather, attitudes should be seen as being primarily attitudes towards possible states of affairs of the world and not to the propositions that distinguish between those states.
20. Therefore, a belief state can be represented as a set of possible worlds. To believe that P is for the proposition that P to be true in all possible worlds in the belief state.

On this conception, beliefs are something negative: to believe that P is simply to be in a belief state which lacks any possible world which P is false. We can understand how a person has beliefs by default, or even if they are unimaginative.

Stalnaker considers an objection to (20): there surely area an infinite number of possible worlds compatible with anyone's belief state. He accepts this, but adds that a believer's representation of a space of possible worlds need not distinguish between them all; just as a finite perceiver might see a space which consists of an an infinite number of points. So too may a finite believer represent a space of possible worlds which in fact consists of an infinite number of possible worlds.

As for my 10¢, I'm happy to accept 15. I don't see why they should be given up. It seems intuitive to me that beliefs are something involving awareness. Jones may act in accordance with a rule or with his believing something, yet be unable to ascribe to himself his own rule-following or believing. He is, as it were, apeing or simply going through the motions. I think that one's acting like one believes isn't enough to make one an actual believer. I may be tempted to ascribe to Jones or a dog that they have a belief or know something given instances of behavior or whatever which I take to be actions that are in accordance with a rule or belief, but I think that self-ascription is important to differentiate a iron filing being attracted to a magnet, a thermometer rising when heated, or a dog digging for a bone from a contemplative and reflective Russell or Jones.

I think that we must deny that Russell literally believed the apparent belief that Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben, even if Russell's belief states were compatible with only worlds where Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben. I presume that Russell didn't speak Egyptian or Cree, so it seems plainly absurd to think that he literally believes all sorts of Egyptian or Cree sentences because they are compatible with his belief states. Russell never entertained such sentences anymore than the proposition that Frege's left earlobe is smaller than Big Ben. So how could he literally believe it?

I suppose someone like Stalnaker may think: "If Russell would assent to the sentence "Russell believes that P" this shows that Russell believes that P, and that Russell believed that P before he was asked." But I'm inclined to think: "If Russell would assent to the sentence "Russell believes that P" this shows that Russell believes that P, but that Russell did not occurrently believe that P before he was asked. Perhaps in some sense Russell was disposed to believe that P, but this isn't enough for him to literally believe that P."