tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3721325436856911698.post5792555989067997629..comments2023-11-02T04:47:48.720-07:00Comments on A Novel Proposition: Question for DanChris Tillmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07039880090804518326noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3721325436856911698.post-35284027002693306752008-09-19T11:54:00.000-07:002008-09-19T11:54:00.000-07:00I guess I wonder:1) If Wes is a thing, atemporall...I guess I wonder:<BR/><BR/>1) If Wes is a thing, atemporally frozen, then he cannot know about the past or future. But Wes seems to be an event, a spacetime worm which is temporally located through past presents where he was present. I hope Wes makes it to future presents as well. Though the future is outside of this time, it is a potential present.<BR/><BR/>2) I would agree that knowledge of something, reference to something, bearing propositional attitudes to something, doesn't depend upon having spacial or temporal relations to that thing, but I still think that thing needs to have a spacial or temporal location.<BR/><BR/>If France exists outside of here, it just seems I could in principle go there. If Platonistic entities exist outside of spacetime, I'm not sure how I could go there.<BR/><BR/>The future exists outside of now, but it does seem that I could in principle go there.Wes McPhersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07419648634722401067noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3721325436856911698.post-64240158031012081392008-09-19T11:26:00.000-07:002008-09-19T11:26:00.000-07:00You're correct in the dissanalogy, but it seems to...You're correct in the dissanalogy, but it seems to be similar to an objection I address in the post.<BR/>My reponse was, consider the sept.19/2008 11AM wes. He exists only at one time. Anything in the future of 09/19/08 exists entirely outside that time. Therefore 09/19/08 wes can't know anything about any date past 09/19/08. This is just equivalent to saying that at 09/19/08, we san't know anything about the future. Proceed to generalize to all times.<BR/><BR/>I also thing that the formulation (A) and (B) only support the case. Formally they're no different from the original benaceraf formulation, but they clearly make a bad argument. Consider replacing (B) with (B')<BR/>(B') If France exists, it exists entirely outside of here.<BR/><BR/>The upshot is that knowledge of something, reference to something, bearing propositional attitudes to something, in general doesn't have to depend on spacial or temporal relations to that thing.Danhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02122784992711602521noreply@blogger.com