This may be more timely for next time, but I wanted to ask it anyhow.
It seems that for truth we need correspondence. So we have a fact-in-the-world bit on the one side, and a representation-of-a-fact bit on the other. So:
(1) •Snow is white• is true iff it is the case that snow is white.
Or, it seems,
(2) •It was temperature d at time t• is true if it is the case that it was temperature d at time t.
It seems that we can still have the fact-in-the-world bit going on in the absence of propositions. Propositions are just going to be the representation-of-a-fact bit. So the left-hand side bits of (1) and (2) might not be there. But this seems consistent with the right-hand side bits may still have obtained.
Doesn't it seem plausible that something might be the case, even though it fails to be represented as being true or false?