This post overlaps Wes’s post below to some extent. King argues that representation is external to propositions, but that no Benacerraf dilemma follows from this. The argument appears to rely on something like Meinongianism about possible propositions. But it’s not clear to me that it needs to.
Here’s a sketch of the argument. Let’s call the proposition semantically encoded by the sentence (S)
(S) ‘John loves babies’
‘p’
(assuming there is such an entity). The argument begins with the assumption that representation is external, and concludes by showing that no Benacerraf dilemma follows from this assumption.
(1) Representation is external.
If (1) were true, then, given Jubien’s argument for internal representation, in addition to p, either there actually exists some entity q that has an equal claim to being the proposition encoded by (S), or there could have existed an entity q that could have been the proposition encoded by (S).
(2) If (1), then some entity q actually exists and has a claim to be the proposition semantically encoded by (S), or some entity q could have existed, and could have been the proposition semantically encoded by (S).
Assuming (1) (as King does), we have (3):
(3) Some entity q actually exists and has a claim to be the proposition semantically encoded by (S), or some entity q could have existed, and could have been the proposition semantically encoded by (S). (1,2)
According to King, the first disjunct of (3) is false. It’s not the case, he argues, that the intentional activities of speakers that in fact brought p into existence also brought q into existence. If they did, then q would have actually had equal claim to being the proposition encoded by (S). But they didn’t. So the first disjunct of (3) is false.
(4) It’s not the case that some entity q actually exists and has some claim to be the proposition semantically encoded by (S).
So, given (3) and (4), we have (5):
(5) So, some entity q could have existed and could have been the proposition semantically encoded by (S). (3,4)
But the truth of (5) is not sufficient to generate a Benacerraf dilemma, since it’s not the case that more than one entity exists and has equal claim to being the proposition encoded by (S).
(6) If (5), then it is not the case that more than one entity exists and has equal claim to being the proposition semantically encoded by (S).
(7) So, it is not the case that more than one entity exists and has equal claim to being the proposition semantically encoded by (S). (5,6)
(8) So, representation is external, and it is not the case that more than one entity exists and has equal claim to being the proposition semantically encoded by (S); i.e., no Benacerraf dilemma follows. (1,7)
My concern is with the consequent of the conditional in (2), and so with the move from the subconclusion in (3) to that in (5). Given that King thinks (4) is true, it seems like holding (5) commits King to Meinongianism about possible candidates for being the proposition encoded by (S). At least, this much seems true: if (5) is true, then there are possible propositions that do not actually exist. Assuming that King takes actual existence to just BE existence, then this claim seems to commit King to saying that there are possible, non-existent entities. And this seems equivalent to some version of Meinongianism (Meinongian possibilism, I guess). Do the two disjuncts in the consequent of (2) exhaust all the options?
Let’s say we were uncomfortable with Meinongian possibilism. Maybe we think that whatever is in any way exists, and whatever exists in any way actually exists. If we thought this, then we’d probably be uncomfortable with Meinongian possibilism. But consider whatever activities on the parts of intentional agents King thinks are sufficient for bestowing truth-conditions (and hence representationality) on p. I’m not sure what these activities are (it sounds like he goes over it at some length in ch.2), but maybe it’s like this. Maybe together these activities constitute some complex relation R such that it is in virtue of intentional agents bearing R to p that p (actually) is the proposition semantically encoded by (S). Given that intentional agents do, actually, in fact bear R to p, why can’t King accept that there exists some entity q that intentional agents could have borne, but do not actually in fact bear, R to? King’s worry is that there might actually exist an entity q such that intentional agents actually bear R to both p and q. This would lead to a Benacerraf dilemma. But this isn’t the case here. In the case under consideration, there is only one entity that intentional agents bear R to. We may not know exactly which entity it is, or what it’s like (that seems like a job for the metaphysics of propositions). But if these thoughts are sound, we could rewrite (2) as (2’):
(2’) If (1), then some entity q actually exists and could have been the proposition semantically encoded by (S), or some entity q could have existed, and could have been the proposition semantically encoded by (S).
The foe of Meinong could then accept the first conjunct of (2’), deny the second, and still generate a conclusion that is the same as King’s (8). I suppose the real worry then is King’s claim that intentional actions on the parts of conscious agents literally bring p into existence. If intentional actions literally bring propositions into existence, then it wouldn’t be possible to say that some entity distinct from p actually exists and could have been the proposition encoded by (S). Could we avoid this worry by holding that the entity that is now, in fact, p- some type of structured complex, presumably- existed before the intentional actions of conscious agents, but that these actions somehow bestowed upon p its ‘propositionality’? This is admittedly vague, but if we could, then something like (2’) might work. What do you guys think?
3 comments:
To add some vagueness to your vagueness, we might think of 'propositionality' as a sort of relation, maybe function, and then we could think that a community, in some sense, opens a region of logical space for them to occupy. The use of the words to mean stuff, as it were, is a special feature which is defined by use.
This might be like having paints and brushes in a bucket. These pieces can be structured and made into a picture. The component paint bits now map something, but a mapper is needed to read the map, and see what the mappee is.
I guess I'm also just curious by what we mean by "entity". If a proposition is an encoded fact, say, do we need any entities to come into play? Or is "entity" being used in such a sense as to mean "object" or "property" or "relation" or..., etc.?
I also wonder if we take the sign-design / inscription:
*d-a-t-e*
and say: in English, this might mean a piece of fruit, or an appointment with someone, we are talking about distinct token-classes. So if we talk about that s.d. / inscription expressing another proposition, are we not talking about a distinct token-class?
Here's a bit of clarification that may help here. Look on page 132, first full paragraph:"It is true on my view that 'something else could have been the proposition that snow is white' in the sense that some different fact could have had as components the property of being snow and the property of being white, could have been true iff snow is white, (for example, the sentential relation, which is part of the propositional relation, might have been different), and could have been intrinsically most eligible to play the role of the proposition that snow is white."Sorry for the long quote, but I think it reveals some things about his view. First, the scare quotes are to point out that he doesn't deny necessity of identity. For any proposition p, it's not that case that there's some q such that p does not equal q and q could've been p. What does he mean? Let's define a predicate F, do designate the functional role of a proposition. Some of the criterion for being an F is (according to the quote):1) being a fact2) having the properties involved in the proposition as constituents3) being true whenever the proposition in question is true 4) involves the correct sentential relationsSuppose you have a proposition p such that Fp. Suppose also there's another proposition candidate q. It could have been the case that speakers developed language in such a way that p didn't satisfy(4), but q did. If this had been the case, Fq would be true, and q would be the the thing we call "the proposition". As things stand, it seems that q is merely a fact that's true whenever p is and has all the right constituents.Given these considerations, it seems like it would do little damage to King's theory to restate (5) in your post as (5'):(5')there exists some entity q distinct from p that could have been the proposition semantically encoded by (S)
So far, this is the same point you were raising with your (2'). But you rightly comment that King talks in terms of people bringing things into existence. Well, we talk in those terms too. To the point, we can say in some sense that humans bring sentences into existence (not in the broad sense of "bring into existence" of course). In this sense, humans DO bring Kingian propositions into existence (the way people bring children into existence), since propositions essentially have sentential relations as constituents.
Post a Comment