Recall early in the semester we breifly considred a position that identified what is asserted with sentences of a language. The main objection to that position came from the translation principle (the principle that a sentence of a different language can have the same meaning as a sentence in the first language). The objection went as follows:
1) 'There's chaos in my bed' and 'yesh balagan b'mita sheli' assert the same thing
2) A statement of 'yesh balagan b'mita sheli' does not assert 'there's chaos in my bed'
3) A statement of 'there's chaos in my bed' does not assert 'yesh balagan b'mita sheli'
5) If declarations of sentences assert sentences, then (1)->~(4)
6) ~[(1)->~(4)] (1,4)
7) It's not the case that declarations of sentences assert sentences
The idea behind (5) is that if what is asserted is a sentence, then the most plausible candidate for what is asserted is the sentence used to make the assertion. If this is right, (2) and (3) are plausible. But if (1) is true, and either one of the given sentences must be what is asserted, either (2) or (3) must be false.
One major consideration for accepting (4) is that to choose (2) to be false or (3) to be false would be an arbitrary choice. In other words, there's no principled way to choose what sentence is asserted by a sentence of a given meaning (indeed, what is asserted by ALL sentences with that meaning).
But this is (on the face of it) is just a benaceraf dilema. A proponent of the view could look a few classes forward and say to the proposition theorist that she will face benaceraff dilemas anyway. That is no reason to reject the view at hand.
Obviously the analogy is a bad one, but why?