tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3721325436856911698.post8755154973728188234..comments2023-11-02T04:47:48.720-07:00Comments on A Novel Proposition: Benacerraf & Russell wonderChris Tillmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07039880090804518326noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3721325436856911698.post-59746583223010068002008-10-27T20:47:00.000-07:002008-10-27T20:47:00.000-07:00Does the B.D. admit that there are candidate entit...Does the B.D. admit that there are candidate entities? Or just that if there were, we couldn't choose. So that even if they did exist it would be like they didn't.<BR/><BR/>I guess I'm still not clear on it.Wes McPhersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07419648634722401067noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3721325436856911698.post-69651460521324805872008-10-27T20:41:00.000-07:002008-10-27T20:41:00.000-07:00Hi Wes,Both (2) and (3) are epistemic, but the poi...Hi Wes,<BR/><BR/>Both (2) and (3) are epistemic, but the point about (1) is supposed to be semantic. If Russell's truth conditions for (1) are correct, then (1) is false. There are alternative semantic proposals for definite descriptions according to which such a description is neither true nor false. For further discussion, see here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descriptions/<BR/><BR/>I think you're right that we should generally distinguish indeterminacy, which is metaphysical or semantic, from underdetermination, which is epistemological. And I agree that we should be dubious of inferences of the form 'We can't tell which xs are F, so no xs are F'! But the Benacerraf problem at least purports to be a different problem. It's that there's no way in principle to decide between the candidates. So even if one had all of the relevant epistemic information, no metaphysical answer is forthcoming. It is a separate question whether this sort of inference is a good one.Chris Tillmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07039880090804518326noreply@blogger.com