tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3721325436856911698.post5837357330561593104..comments2023-11-02T04:47:48.720-07:00Comments on A Novel Proposition: King vs SchifferChris Tillmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07039880090804518326noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3721325436856911698.post-40894057118822601102008-09-24T00:28:00.000-07:002008-09-24T00:28:00.000-07:00I think King holds that in fact that-clauses are r...I think King holds that in fact that-clauses are refering expressions. His argument against (ii) just shows that the Russellian isn't committed to that-clauses being refering expressions.He gives an example of a that-clause being a quantifier. On this analysis of that-clauses, they never refer, not only in the scope of propositional attitude verbs. However I don't think he'd actually take this line.His view rejects the inference described in (2) by denying that the referent of a that clause is a function of the referents of all its parts. This is easy to do because (as he points out on p.106) not every part of a TC has a referent, but it still has a semantic value.As for your follow-up, the inference:(2)Fido barks therefore there exists and x such that Fido x<BR/>is incoherent just for syntactical reasons. 'Barks' is a verb, and explicitly quantifying over it is treating it as a noun.<BR/>Also, some people might have qualms with inferring the existence of things not specifically reffered to by a noun merely by using existential generalization. For instance, consider:<BR/>(P) Fido is brown, therefore there's an X such that Fido is X<BR/>People who are are anti-properties will deny the inference, or at least ascribe it merely instrumental value. They wouldn't claim that the existential in the consequent is truely comitting.<BR/>But, as Chris pointed out, I'd like to see them try and say it's not.Danhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02122784992711602521noreply@blogger.com